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Abstract
A method for ~rnplementing secure personal computing in a network
with one or more cp.ntrsl facilities is described. The method employs
a public-key encryption device and hardware keys. Each user is respon_
sible for his own security and need not rely on the security of the
central facility o~ the communication links.
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Introduction

Within the next ten years many of us will have personal computers
linked to a centrul facility.

1

The central facility (CF) will offer

many attractive features: long term storage, text editors, language proces_
sors, special purpose software, video games, access to large data banks,
and electronic mail foT. communication among users on the network.
CF could also

pos~

The

a serious threat: any or all of the secrets we entrust

with it could be stolen without our even beiog aware of the theft.
Personal communication sent over the network could be int2rcepted; files
stored in the CF could be copied; boohy-trapped software borrowed from
the CF and run on our personal computers could transmit confidential data
back to its owner via the CF.
This paper
in the network.

de~cribes
T~e

a simple method for safeguarding personal data

method evolved from consideration of three basic

premises: user respo"sibility, possibLe security flaws in the CF, and
limited sharing of confidential information among users.
The first premise is that each user should be responsible for the
security of his electronic possessions, just as he is for his other
sessions.

He should be able to protect his electronic possessions to the

same-degree and
sessions.

1.

pos~

wit~

the same precautions as he protects his other pos_

For example, several options are available for safeguarding

Although I shall ~ssume there is a single central facility, the
security mechani~ms described here apply equally to networks with
multiple central facilities.

2

jewelry or important

~~pers:

an unlocked drawer, a locked cabinet, a

steel vault, a safe deposit box, etc.
inconvenience of

eac~ ~ption

One evaluates the risks, cost, and

to select the most suitable alternative.

Likewise, I propose a system in which each user can select safeguards
for computer files 3nd communication with roughly similar risks, costs,
and convenience.
standing the

It is important that the user feel confident in under_

limitati~ns

of the safeguards he selects.

The second premise is that a user should not have to rely on or trust
the CF or the communication links of the network for the safety of his
data.

The proof of a complex CF should not be a prerequisite for security

to the customers.
no

guaran~ee ~ha~

Even if the CF could be proven secure,
its

specifica~ion6

compromise could not uccur.

were

comple~e

or

~hat

~here

would be

an unsuspected

However, there are strong economic reasons

for the designers of the CF to build a secure and reliable system.

An

unreliable or insecure CF will lose its customerst no user will entrust
a CF with files or maii that are subject to accidental (or intential)
loss or destruction.
tion of his data,

ilE

But whereas a user can recognize the loss or destruc_
cannot recognize its theft.

Nevertheless, the customers

of the CF must fee'. that their personal data cannot be stolen even in the
presence of hardware faults, software errors, or malicious

at~acks.

The third premise is that sharing of confidential information among
users of the CF is limited.

In MULTICS, for example, whose design is

based on sharability and whose philosophy encourages sharing, there is
in fact little inte~_user sharing [Mon77].

Consequently, users can share

copies of confidential files rather than originals without straining the

3

resources of the

cr.

Users can share originals of nonconfidential files,

hO·,oIever.

l1y proposal places the responsibility for safeguarding

data on the

personal

The security of data stored in the CF or transmitted

owner~

through the CF does not depend on the security or correctness of the CF
or the communication links.

The principal mechanism is a public_key

encryption device and hardware keys.
personal data to the

his secret key.

~~tent

The mechanism allows

3

user to protect

that he protects the hardware unit containing

The method differs from those described by Popek and

Kline [PoK7S] and N~edham and Schroeder [NeS77] in that both of these
approaches rely on the security and correctness of the network, princi_
pally its key

mana~e~nt

facilities.

The basic idea was inspired by Tannenbaum's paper [Tan??], which
describes a distributed interactive system wherein each user has his own
dedicated LSI microcomputer.
nected to a

centra~

These "personal computersl l are each con-

minicomputer, which provides file storage and software.

To run a program, a user submits a request to the central machine, which
then sends a copy of the program to the user1s computer for execution.
Tanenbaum's design has considerable merit.

The central operating

system is considerably less complex than is customary for large centralized
time-sharing systems.

The system supports a heterogeneous network of

microcomputers, enabling it to take advantage of advances in ndcrocomputer
technology.

Although Tanenbaum does not discuss data security, the prin_

ciple feature of
security.

us~r

isolation provides a good basis for implementing

The encryption scheme proposed in this paper could complete the

4

rlc51[.lIo

1 <..Illl

cU~::-C:1tJy

investigating the security properties of 11

system patterned Riter Tannenbaum's design.

The following

~ection

outlines the mechanism.

Subsequent sections

describe how the mechanism solves three important security problems:
personal secrecy, secure communications and sharing, and secure signatures.
A final section outlipes the requirements of the interface with the CP.
In the interest of conveying the basic ideas, I have omitted many details.

5

The Security

t-lcchil~

The security Ir.ec.hanism consists of an encryption device, which connects
to a personal

COIlliJIJter,

and hardware keys.

The encryption device implements

a public-key encryption algorithm as proposed by Diffie and Hellman [01H76J
and further investigated by Rivest, Shamir,.'and Adleman [RSA78].

Under

publicNkey encryption, a plaintext message is enciphered using a pUblic
key P and deciphered using a secret (or private) key s. 2
and decipher

algori~hros

and are publicly
Let x

Y

The encipher

are inverse algorithms over the same message space

av~ilable.

denote t.he enciphering or deciphering of X with key Y.

a given plaintext message H, the corresponding ciphertext C

~s

For

related to

Mby the relations:
P
C= M

and

S

P = C •

Furthermore, for either plaintext or ciphertext message X,
=

S
(X /

=

x.

There are two important security properties of public-key encryption.
First, given a ciphertext C, it is computationally infeasible to compute
S

the corresponding plaintext message M = C without knowledge of the secret
key S.

Second, given a public key P, it is computationally infeasible to

compute the

corresro~ding

distributed without

2.

secret key S.

~isking

Thus public keys can be freely

the security of enciphered data.

The notation used here follows that suggested in [NeS77] rather than
that in [DilI76,RSA7S], wherein liEu and 1I[)11 denote encryption and
decryption transformations, respectively.
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A pair of hardwar~ keys (memory chips) implement a (public, secret)
key pair.

The owner of the keys is told what character Seqllence is IIbunled

in ll the memory chip of the public IIP_keyll so that he can -~ell it to his

associates.

However, the sequence "burned inl l the memory chip of the secret

IIS_keyll is not revealed to anyone, including the key's owner. 3

The encryptioI. device connects to a users personal computer (pc) and

has separate sockets for the P and S keys.

In addition, it has a facility

for setting an alternative " so ft ll public key, ALT_P, and a <:.oggle switch

for selecting between the P and ALT_P keys.

The encryption device and

hardware keys could be built as a single unit.

However, it is essential

that the device containing the memory chip for the S_key be detachable
fom the PC and be sufficiently small that the user can protect it as he
would any other keYe
Figure 1 shows how the device would be used to encipher and decipher
data transmitted between a user1s PC and the CF.
from the user's PC is
it is transrndtted to

~nciphered
~he

CF.

A message X originating

with the P_key (or the ALT_P key) before

A message Y originating from the CF is

deciphered with thp. S_key when it is received.

All data transmitted

between a user's PC and the CF must pass through the encryption device.
No other communication lines between a PC and the CF are

pe~tted,

thus

assuring a user that his confidential data· is properly enciphered and
deciphered.
The purpose of
user to transmit

3.

th~

toggle switch and soft public key is to enable a

mes~ages

to the CF and other users on the network.

Hhen

By keeping the S_key secret, it is more difficult for someone to duplicate
it.
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Figure 1.

The Encryption Mechanism.
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the caggie is set at the P_kcy, information transmitted [rom the user's
PC connot be deciphered by anyone but the user.

In order to transmit

messages to the CF or anath,er user, the sender IlDJSt. set his toggle t.o

ALT_P and supply the receiver's public key.

The receiver's key could

be supplied, Eor p.xarople, by a command issued from the userls pc.

More_

over, while the toggle is set to ALT_P, software running on the PC can
s~ne

set ALT_P to be the

as P, freeing the user of the need to reset the

toggle to use his personal public key.

However, this is ies5 secure than

enciphering with the hdrd P_key, as the user must rely on (possibly
borrowed) software to supply the correct key.
An important property of this mechanism is that the CF does not
keep a record of

s~c~et

keys.

The key manufacturer may keep records of

keys in order to handle lost or stolen keys, but these could be securely
stored in a steel vault.

It is primarily for this reason this system

uses public-key encryption rather than single-key encryption, such as the
Data Encryption Standard (DES) [NBS77].

Under single_key encryption,

the same secret key is used both for encryption and decryption, making
it necessary for

th~

CF to maintain and safeguard lists of secret keys.

In order for the CF to transmit ciphertext to a user, it must know the
user's secret key.

In order for two users to communicate, the CF must

generate and distribute a secret communication key.

Thus, the security of

the system depends on the security of the key management facilities, violating
the premise that the users should not have to rely on the security mech_
anisms of the CF.

9

A user may
information

r~veal

arriv~ng

his public key to the eF, however.

Since all

at his personal computer is automatically deciphered

with his S_key, it also lnust be enciphered with his P_key in order to
appear in plaintext in his PC.

If the user reveals his public key to

the eF, the CF can, for example, encipher programs requested by the user
before transmitting t'ilcm to the user1s

pc.

However, it is not necessary for a user to give bis public key to
the eF, as the

us~~

can perform the encryption himself.

This works as

follows: the CF transmits plaintext message X, which is tacn deciphered
S
S
upon arrival at the us~rls PC, giving X • The user then r~utes x back
through his encryption device to get (XS)p = X (see Figure 2).
a user need give his
data in ciphertext

~_key

~nd

Therefore,

to the CF only if he wishes the CF to transmdt

the data has not been previously enciphered (either

by the user hirnselt or some other user).
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Figure 2.

Transmission of Plaintext X from Central FaciliLy to User's
Personal Coraputer.
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Personal Secrecy
To implement personal secrecy, the user sets the toggle switch of his
encryption device to his public P_key.

Since all information transndtted

from his PC is autcmatically enciphered using his P_key, it is computationally
infeasible for anyone to decipher information outside of his PC without
acquiring his secret S_key.

and there is

But the S_key is engraved in a memory chip

copy of it in the CF; thus a perpetrator must steal or

TIC

duplicate it in order to decipher the data.
With this

me~anlsm,

documents in the

C~.

4

a user can safely store (enciphered) secret

No perpetrator will be able to break into the CF

and decipher the documents.
A user CQuid safely run software supplied by the CF on his PC without
fear of

i1

Iltrojan horscll t.heft..

If the soft.ware package att.empt.ed to

t.ransmit the user',3 di\ta back t.o ita owner J t.he data would be automat.ically
enciphered with the user's keYJ rendering it useless to the owner of the
package.
Consequent.1YJ a compilerJ for example J could not st.eal proprietary
software under development J or an income tax program could not steal
confidential financial records.

The mechanism can thus be used to implement

confined (or memoryless) subsystems [Lam71].

5

The mechanism does not J

4.

Alt.ernatively, it may be possible for a perpetrat.or t.o rig an encryption
device to record secret keys. If this posed a serious threat. J it would
be necessary for a user to safeguard the encryption device he used as
well as the key. Thus there is same advantage to a single device con_
taining both t.he encrypt.ion algorithms and t.he memory chips implementing
the keys.

5.

However, it. may be possible to leak information ov 'I covert channels" ; e.g.,
by encoding it in the rat.e or quantity of transmitt.ed ciphertext.

12

however, safeguard data supplied (in plaintext) to programs run at the CF.
To safeguard data in this case requires sophisticated
within the CF.

prot~ction

mechanism5
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Secure

Cornmunicat~on

and Sharing

Secure cCllulIl1I1=ation is achieved with end_to-end encryption; that is,

the sender enciphers the message before transmission and the receiver
deciphers the message upon receipt.

Suppose users A and B wish to be

able to communicate securely through the CF.
and B exchange their public keys

This is easily done if A

P and P respectively.
A
B

As suggested by

Diffie and Hellman ~DiH76J, A sends messages enciphered with P to B;
B

similarly B sends messages enciphered with P to A (see Figure 3).
A

Secure

one_ way communication is achieved if either A or B transmits data enciphered
with the other's public key.
There is clearly no danger of an intruder intercepting snd deciphering
messages transmitted

~his

way.

To guard against the

probl~m

of replay, a

sequence number or time stamp can be inserted into a message before it is
enciphered.
The method can also be used to implement sharing of confidential files.
Suppose user A has a confidential file F stored in the CF and enciphered under
FA.

To share F

wi~h

another user B, A requests a copy of F from the CF.

Since F is automaticaily deciphered under SA when it reaches A1s PC, A has
only to send it

bac~

to the CF enciphered under P in order that B, and only
B

B, be able to decipher it (see Figure 4).

(A must also instruct the CF to add

this new version of F to B's file directory.)

Should A updnte F and wish

toshare the updated version with B, the process would be repeated.
The important point in both cases is that all confidential information
travelling through the network or stored in the CF is enciphered.
does the CF have

acc~ss

At no time

to plaintext or to the secret keys required to

decipher the information.

ALT .. P

P

- ,-p--'\-~"

L'

A'.
PC

. i ~: ~
-- X ~...J>
encipher

'- X

t!: . Y ----

,<

-decipher

'''''1

I,;ii·~·~

p.

- __

I

I.

v

P
A

ALT_P
P
.. - "P I'~ F,

.
,
:

CF

!
;

L__

SA

~'-'"

~-

encipher .( .- y

I

i--

-:."

A.,

..,..

dee-ipher

...

X "7-

.'.
PC

'''',

-~."
.,.'

-

S.

~

Figure 3.

Secure Communication Between Two Users A and B.
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Secure Signatures
The method can be used to implement secure signatures as described
by Diffie and HeUman [D1H76J; to send a signed message X to B, A first

deciphers X with h:='s secret key SA before transmi tHng it, enciphered
under Bis public kzy PB·

When B receives the message, i t is automatically

deciphered under SB' so that B has only to encipher i t under PA to obtain
the original message and kn at" that it came from A (since only A could have
enciphered it under 3 ) (see Figure 5).
A
As outlined above, the method suffers from the problem pointed out

by Saltzer [5a178J; B has no assurance that A did not loan, give away, or
lose his private key.
hardware.

This problem could be solved with more sophisticated

When a useL purchased a (P,S) key pair, his voice_print (or some

other identifying characteristic) could be recorded in the

S~key.

of the S_key would thar. somehow require the user to supply

£I

Activation

matching print.

With this device, a signature could also be used to authenticate a user to
the CF.
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Interface with Ceilt:ral Facility

The CF is also equiped with a pair of keys and one or more encryption
devices.

All incoming

messages may be automatically

deciphered, although this is not required for security.
must identify and decipher messages addressed to it.
by prefixing

mess~~e6

However, the CF

This could be done

to the CF with a fixed_format header identifying

the GF, the sende~, and the time of transmission (to guard against replay).
Upon receipt of a message, the CF would attempt to decipher the beginning
of the message.

If the message begins with a recognizable hc.ader, the CF

would continue deciphering the message; otherwise, the CF would simply
route the message, in ciphertext, as directed by a previous command.
example, a user A
first send a

~ishing

request~

For

to store a confidential file at the CF would

properly headed and enciphered under D •
Cp

This would

be followed by the file, enciphered under D •
A
The CF may provide Ildirectory assistancell for public keys of its
customers.

If a user wished to make his key generally available, he could

list it with the CF.

Alternatively, a user can have an unlisted key and

personally give it to his associates.
There is some ~isk associated with obtaining keys from the directory.
If the CF sends an incorrect key (either accidently or

int~ntionally),

the

recipient of the key may unknowingly encipher confidential messages that
are decipherable to a perpetrator rather than his associate I

,

.

\

.
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Summary
I have outlined a scheme for implementing secure personal computing
in a large network with one or more central

facilities~

The scheme is

based on the use uf a public-key encryption device and hardware keys in
the form of memory ~hips.

Each user is responsible for protecting his

own data and need not rely on the security of the network.

All confi_

dential data is enciphered before it is transmitted to the central facility
or another user on

t~e

network.

The central facility is not responsible

for enciphering or de~iphering data and, therefore, is not given access
to either plaintext or the secret keys needed to decipher the ciphertext.
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